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ABSTRACT
Th e impact of biotechnology on all living things is an interdisciplinary inquiry into some 
of humanity’s most fundamental questions: Who are we? How do we live together? How 
do we relate to the biosphere, to the rest of the living world? Are the answers given to these 
questions shaped by various contexts: social, cultural, economic, so on? Are there universal 
answers to these questions? Choosing this interdisciplinary fi eld of knowledge production as 
object of inquiry off ers an opportunity to investigate how traditional theories and disciplines 
are challenged to evolve in new directions as a response to techno-scientifi c developments of 
our times. It also allows us to study patterns of knowledge production, to examine hierarchies 
of knowledge and expertise, as well as the possibilities of interdisciplinary/transdisciplinary 
practices in a multicultural context. 
I will argue that a framework that incorporates universal principles shall constitute one di-
mension of an adequate ethical theory in the context of new genetics providing that its princi-
ples are formulated in non-exclusionary terms that refl ect the relational context of individual 
lives. As Judith Butler has formulated »the problem is not with the universality, as such, but 
with an operation of universality that fails to be responsive to cultural particularity and fails 
to undergo a reformulation of itself in response to social and cultural conditions it includes 
within the scope of its applicability. When a universal precept cannot, for social reasons be 
appropriated or when …it must be refused, the universal precept itself becomes a site of 
contest, a theme and an object of democratic debate« (Butler, 2006, p. 6). What both femi-
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»Th ere can be no culturally and psychologically perceptive ethics without taking 
into account the diversity of moral lives, but there can be no ethics at all without 
universals ... Th e hard part is to devise a theory that can readily join universality 
and the moral complexity of everyday life« (Callahan 2000, p. 38, 41).
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nist and critical bioethicists emphasize in connection with universalistic claims in bioethics 
is the necessity of refl ectivity upon such norms and concepts. Habermas also concludes that 
sociological reservations off er salutary corrections to normativism, but these critiques do not 
condemn normative theories to failure by social complexity. According to Habermas, purely 
normative considerations retain their relevance as long as we accept that complex societies 
shape themselves in a refl exive manner through law and politics (Habermas, 2008, p. 276) 
Th e selective readings of norms that have the grammatical form of universal statements but 
at the semantic level are vulnerable to particularistic interpretations of their basic concepts, 
such as persons, human being, call for an empirical explanation (Habermas, 2008, p. 285). 
Taken all these into account, and noting that the issues that are at stake in the ethical debates 
on the applications of various biotechnologies and genetics can deeply aff ect the ways we 
perceive us as humans, our relationships with others, and with the environment it would be 
more than desirable that in these debates a plurality of approaches to be represented, as this is 
stipulated in the three UNESCO Declarations on Bioethics. 
Key words: bioethics, feminist bioethics, critical bioethics, knowledge production, contex-
taulisation 
Introduction
Th e developments in life sciences and in the »new and emerging« technologies have 
raised issues that have called into question those beliefs which are constitutive of our 
perspectives of ontological reality. As philosophers of technology highlight, new 
technologies are going to produce not only new ontologies, but new roles and new 
responsibilities too (Boenink 2010; Vos and Willems 2000). Th e impact of the tech-
no-scientifi c developments on all living things represents therefore a fi eld for inter-
disciplinary inquiry into some of humanity’s most fundamental questions: Who we 
are? How do we live together? How do we relate to the biosphere, to the rest of the 
living world? How do we defi ne what is ‘natural’? What it means to be a human 
person?1 Relating to and deciding about certain applications in this context it is not 
merely a question of negotiating the risks and benefi ts of a particular application, 
but often entails probing our conceptions of life, personhood, death, the meaning 
of illness and suff ering, and of human nature. Th e emerging medical technologies 
for example continuously shift our notions of health and disease, and these shifts 
lead to new conceptions of health. Such changes than inevitably result in new ethi-
cal challenges in the fi eld of healthcare (Stempsey 2006, p. 241). As birth, illness, 
and death increasingly come under technological control, struggles arise over who 
should control the body and defi ne its limits and capacities. Biotechnologies turn 
the traditional »facts of life« into matters of expert judgment and public debate 
(Brodwin 2001). As Fisher points out, the spread of new technologies will require 
1 See more about this in Habermas 2003; Fukuyama 2002; Brodwin 2001; Rifkin 1998. 
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new forms of commentary and new forms of public consultation around the legiti-
macy of techno-scientifi c research and innovations (Fischer, 2001, pp. 374).
Th e answers one gives to some basic ontological and conceptual questions infl u-
ences the ways in which he or she thinks and produce knowledge about new tech-
nologies. A number of questions shall than be posed: Can the various values, 
views and opinions related to these technologies and their applications be negoti-
ated? Are there universal answers or solutions to these issues? Or the answers given 
to the various problems raised by the techno-scientifi c developments are shaped 
by various contexts: social, cultural, economic, political and scientifi c? Th e diffi  -
culties we face when trying to relate to and especially to take responsible decisions 
about the future of techno-scientifi c developments in the present context are in-
deed signifi cant. Bioethics has facing these diffi  culties too. In the current context 
it can not always relay on its traditional theories and methods to answer such 
questions, since these are also challenged to evolve in new directions as a response 
to techno-scientifi c developments of our times. It is thus not surprising that in the 
recent years there can be observed a renewed concern regarding methodological 
issues in bioethics which also suggests that it is time to reevaluate the role of bio-
ethical theory in a pluralistic society. Bioethics is struggling to fi nd or to develop 
new frameworks and methodologies that are suited to the techno-scientifi c cul-
ture and scientifi c context we are living in.
One of the biggest challenges in the current context is to agree on global, universal 
norms and frameworks, while respecting the plurality of values and opinions too 
(Pellegrino 2000, p. 658; Turner 2003). It is not surprising thus that the ongoing 
debate in bioethics about the relation between universalism and particularism, be-
tween normative and descriptive, empirical approaches became highly relevant in 
this context. While more and more voices join those views that support a dialog be-
tween these two approaches rather than continuing the dualistic ‘either-or’ ap-
proach, there is still much to be done on the matters of how exactly such integration 
can be achieved. Our knowledge about how to integrate empirical findings into the 
formulation of normative bioethical principles without losing the normative ap-
proach is very limited yet. Empirical ethics literature suggests the need for further 
elaboration of the methodological process of reaching normative conclusions 
through empirical ethics (Molewijk et al. 2004).
Taking into account that the context of knowledge production in which all the 
above mentioned issues are embedded has gone itself through signifi cant changes 
too I will start my paper with a brief characterization of this context, highlighting 
the role of bioethics in it. Th an I will focus my attention on some theoretical and 
methodological issues related to the possibilities of theory building in bioethics in 
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this current context, focusing on those attempts that try to transgress the gap be-
tween normative and empirical approaches. Choosing this interdisciplinary fi eld of 
knowledge production as object of inquiry off ers an opportunity to investigate not 
only specifi c patterns of knowledge production but also the possibilities of interdis-
ciplinary practices in a multicultural context. Th e lenses that guide my analysis are 
feminist epistemology and critical bioethics. I will argue that a framework that in-
corporates universal principles shall constitute one dimension of an adequate ethical 
theory in the context of life sciences and new technologies providing that the prin-
ciples it relays on are formulated in non-exclusionary terms that refl ect the relational 
context of individual lives. Such a framework than can provide useful background 
for developing and employing methodologies that are suited for interdisciplinary 
inquiry on various bioethical issues and problems. In this paper I will discuss con-
textualization as one of the possible methods that could be effi  cient (off  course com-
bined with other methods) in interdisciplinary attempts aimed to understand the 
relationship between universal and particular, global and local when dealing with 
issues raised by new techno-scientifi c developments.
Bioethics and the context of knowledge production 
Many analysts have noted that fundamental changes are taking place in the ways in 
which scientifi c, social and cultural knowledge is produced.2 We are witnessing a 
new mode of knowledge production, which operates within a context of applica-
tion, and in which problems are increasingly set in an interdisciplinary or transdisci-
plinary framework, rather than within a disciplinary one (Gibbons et al. 1994, p. 
vii). In addition to this the interactions between science and technology, on the one 
hand, and societal issues on the other hand, have intensifi ed, and the issues at stake 
are increasingly becoming public ones.
Biotechnology, together with nanotechnology, information technology and cogni-
tive sciences, often named as »converging technologies«, constitute a virulent fi eld 
of knowledge production. In this fi eld the knowledge generated by various »scienc-
es« is applied, and the resulting »technologies« have various impacts on the individ-
uals, families, society, environment, and so on. But this is not supposed to be a uni-
directional impact. According to current »knowledge politics«, »society« shall 
2 See for example: Gibbons et al. 1994; Th ompson-Klein 2001; Nowotny et al. 2001, 2003. Gibbons’ main idea 
was that the old paradigm of scientifi c discovery (Mode 1) – characterized by the hegemony of theoretical or, at any 
rate, experimental science; by an internally-driven taxonomy of disciplines, and by the autonomy of scientists and 
their host institutions, the universities – has been superseded by a new paradigm of knowledge production (Mode 
2), which is socially distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities 
(Gibbons et al. 1994).
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infl uence, through »deliberative processes« what type of knowledge and what kinds 
of technologies should be developed.3 Shaping knowledge thus became a central ele-
ment for »building society« and an unrestricted production, diff usion and use of 
new knowledge and technology is regarded as no longer feasible. Knowledge shall 
be regulated and restricted, and side-, long-term and accumulative eff ects have to be 
taken into account, possible risks have to be identifi ed, and observance of ethical 
norms monitored (Schmidt 2007, p. 313). 
According to Kastenhofer due to the development of a techno-scientifi c culture the 
former hierarchical relationship between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences might be trans-
formed into a hierarchy between techno-sciences and sciences for accompanying or 
policy support research (Kastenhofer 2007, p. 267-268). While natural and techni-
cal sciences provide knowledge for the development of new technologies, other dis-
ciplines, such as bioethics, economics or social sciences are supposed to produce 
knowledge about these technologies: about their ethical and economic impact for 
example, or about their »societal robustness.« What is interesting for us here in rela-
tion to bioethics is the fact that bioethics is not only a discipline about (bio)technol-
ogy, but due to its engagement with regulatory and policy related issues it has the 
power to make possible (or impossible) certain applications of (bio)technology by 
legitimizing them (or not). Th is is why and how bioethics is connected with power. 
Not only has ethics the power to defi ne new subject positions, but, as Strathern 
notes, it seems to have the capacity to structure social expectations in such ways as 
to create new principles of organization (Strathern 2000, p. 281).
As we can see, bioethics, a discipline developed about 40-50 years ago to solve the 
ethical issues in medical research and clinical practice, by now transcended the strict 
borders of medicine and health care and became an important fi eld of knowledge 
production about a range of life sciences and technologies: genetics, biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, nano-biotechnology, synthetic biology, to name only a few of 
them. In the last two decades, the realization of the impact of biotechnology on all 
of us has propelled bioethics into the public square where law, policy and adjudica-
tion of confl icts take place. With its engagement with »policy« and »legal or regula-
tory« issues, bioethics had an amazing development, not only as it regards its infl u-
ence on decision making processes but from the point of view of its 
institutionalization too. Bioethics, beside technology assessment, risk assessment 
and intellectual property law, gained special relevance as an instrument for framing 
3 »Knowledge politics« is a new fi eld of political activity that has emerged during the last 40 years. It normatively 
defi nes and asses the specifi c type of knowledge that is deemed to be the most important and most desirable for 
the society (Stehr 2005).
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issues, ordering new knowledge, and (re)allocating power in issues related to bio-
technology (Jasanoff  2005, p. 28).
Th ese developments provided bioethics not only with power and recognition, but 
they posed to it new challenges too. Its traditional theories and methods are not al-
ways applicable in a context in which more and more problems require global an-
swers. At the policy level some degree of consensus has to be reached among various 
values, worldviews and opinions to can formulate guidelines or to develop universal 
frameworks for action. Taken into account that the issues raised by the life sciences 
and the new and emerging technologies related to them often touch upon some the 
most important segments of human existence such as birth, death, family, health, 
illness or disease it is not surprising that fi nding consensus is not an easy task. On 
the one hand the fact that these issues are common experiences of each human be-
ing could raise the hope that to reach a consensus about some problems related to 
them would not be so problematic. On the other hand however we have the de-
tailed ethnographic and cross cultural studies that show us how diff erently we inter-
pret and relate to the same basic human experiences as members of diff erent cul-
tures. A number of questions shall be answered than: Can basic assumptions about 
the human condition and worldviews be negotiated? Can a community made up of 
diverse individuals and groups fi nd ways to transcend diff erences in order to reach a 
consensus on some issues, can all of us agree on some universal norms?
Bioethics and policy
In the policy fi eld there have been attempts to defi ne and set up a universally shared 
framework to address the issues related to new technologies and bioethics.4 Th e 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR) propose the con-
cept of human dignity as the overarching principle of bioethics and the human 
rights framework as a way to anchor bioethics in the fi eld of international law. 
Along with human dignity and human rights, non-discrimination, autonomy and 
individual responsibility, informed consent, respect for human vulnerability and 
personal integrity, equality and justice, solidarity and cooperation, and social re-
sponsibility to the common good and the biosphere, Article 12 of the Declaration 
clearly upholds ‘respect for cultural diversity and pluralism’ as a major bioethical 
principle. In order to achieve its aims the Declaration propose »to foster multidisci-
4 Th e UNESCO Universal Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), Th e UNESCO International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data (2003), Th e UNESO Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Human 
Genome, Council of Europe: Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine) (1997) 
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plinary and pluralistic dialogue about bioethical issues between all stakeholders and 
within society as a whole« (UDBHR Article 2/e), and to promote »opportunities for 
informed pluralistic public debate, seeking the expression of all relevant opinions« 
(UDBHR Article 18/3).
My aim in this paper is not to evaluate or interpret the Declaration.5 I will use the 
Declaration as an example for pointing to the diffi  culties of reaching global consen-
sus on some sensitive bioethical issues. Although the UNESCO instrument is rec-
ognized by many as a valuable tool in policy fi eld and »as an extension of interna-
tional human rights law into the fi eld of biomedicine« (Andorno 2009), a number 
of reservations have been formulated on its address: the principles in the Declara-
tion are stated in absolute and inconsistent terms (Selgelid 2005, p. 267-273), the 
relationship between ‘universal’ or ‘fundamental’ principles and the plurality of 
complementary values in the UDDBHR is problematic, the Declaration quotes 
many and diverse values, but does not provide a ranking method, and this can lead 
to serious disagreements (Häyry & Takala 2005, p. 232), the Declaration does not 
pay attention to the existing structural inequities, it only asserts the ‘fundamental 
equality of all human beings in dignity and rights’ but it does not explicitly recog-
nize disparities of power and wealth that deny equal dignity and rights to many 
(Rawlinson and Donchin 2005). While recognizing that the purpose of the UNES-
CO document is to draw attention to fundamentally important bioethical values, 
rather than to resolve deep philosophical questions about conflicts between them, 
the diffi  culties inherent in the attempt to create a framework that incorporates some 
universally shared principles and in the same time is sensitive enough to the wide 
range of contexts in which these principles are going to be applied in real life are 
obvious.6
Th e advantage of thinking theoretically about bioethical issues related to new tech-
nologies is that we are not forced by those constrains policy makers are, namely to 
reach a consensus on various complex issues in order to be able to take decisions on 
them. Th eoretical thinking is free of such constrains and thus can freely engage in 
open and often never ending debates. Such debates, although not directly useful for 
the policy context, can be however helpful in other ways. Th ey can off er insights for 
fi nding ways to transgress the duality of normative and empirical approaches and to 
develop solutions that might be suitable to incorporate both of these approaches in 
5 Th is has been done by scholars who have a deep knowledge about the issues that were involved in adopting the 
UDBHR, since they were involved in diff erent ways in the process of drafting the Declaration. See for example 
Andorno 2009; Sándor 2007.
6 For a more detailed discussion of the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights see: Developing 
World Bioethics 5(3): 197-273; Macer 2009, Kaelin 2009.
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the understanding and interpretation of complex bioethical issues. In the followings 
I will try to contribute with my analysis and suggestions to this endeavor.
Normative and empirical approaches in bioethics
It has to be noted and acknowledged that there are many ways of doing bioethics, and 
bioethics is a dynamic, changing, multi-sited fi eld (de Vries, Turner et al. 2007, p. 3). 
However, according to Jasanoff  the »Western«, mainstream, mainly principialism in-
formed bioethical discourse has the most authority, voice and visibility in biotechnol-
ogy related discussions (Jasanoff  2005, p. 202) and it is also the one that has been in-
creasingly criticized from a number of perspectives: feminist, indigenous people, social 
science, so on. What is common in these critiques is the reference to »mainstream« 
bioethics’ abstract universalism and its indiff erence to the socio-cultural context. Ac-
cording to social science critique, principialism gives a dominant role to the idealized, 
rational thought, and tends to exclude social and cultural factors, relegating them to 
the status of irrelevancies, and acts as if concepts like autonomy, patient, justice, equi-
ty, non-directive, so on, would have the same meaning in each context (Fox and Swa-
zey 2005). Even if one accepts the importance of principles in bioethics there are still 
crucial questions that remain unanswered, for example how one should weigh com-
peting ethical claims in real life situations. Several attempts have been made to fi nd 
solution to this question, however, the development of diff erent models or approaches 
in ethical decision-making – the interpretation and application of competing princi-
ples in »the real world« - remains seriously under-studied. As we could see this theo-
retical problem has been one of the critiques formulated with regard to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Biomedicine too.
Th ere are authors who suggest that instead of abstract principles it would be better to 
focus on values in bioethical theory building. More and more scholars started to share 
the idea that in a pluralist, post-modern scenario, theory loses ground to narrative. In 
order for the variety of religious and cultural voices to be heard in the field of bioeth-
ics, many scholars have called for an »empirical turn« in bioethics (Borry et al. 2005, 
Lopez 2004).7 As a response to such initiatives the defenders of »principle« based bio-
ethics predict the danger of (moral or cultural) relativism, which would occur with 
taking into account the socio-cultural context, the »particulars« and regard empirical 
7 Th e place of social science in bioethics varies by cultural and social context. In the Netherlands and Belgium 
the creation of »empirical bioethics« has given social science an established voice in the bioethical conversation 
(Borry et al. 2005). In North America and the UK, social science methods are widely used in bioethics, but social 
scientists remain, to a certain extent, strangers to the field (Hedgecoe 2004). In Central and Eastern Europe social 
science and bioethics are just starting the dialog, in this context philosophical, legal and theological approaches, as 
well as medical ethics have a more important presence in the fi eld.
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social science as purely descriptive (de Vries, Turner et al. 2007, pp. 2). It is argued 
that the very descriptive nature of the ethnographic social science which gives it its 
usefulness in addressing the dilemma of religious and cultural pluralisms simultane-
ously highlights its inadequacies for engaging in the normative ethical inquiry which 
is characteristic of the ‘ethics’ in ‘bio-ethics’ (Callahan 1999, Solomon 2005).8
Many scholars agree on that the ‘empirical turn’ on itself is unable to solve the prob-
lems in bioethics. Callahan points out that »(o)ne is the need for ethically relevant 
knowledge from social scientists. Another is the parallel need for types of ethical theo-
ry that have a way of effi  caciously using social science knowledge. Still another is a 
way of climbing that most intimidating mountain known as the is-ought fallacy: the 
belief that a moral »ought« can be deduced from a factual »is«.« (Callahan 1999, p. 
286) Th erefore the question is still open: is there a way for not only switching from an 
approach (principialism, universalism) to other (empiricism, particularism) but to 
start a real dialog between them and achieve some degree of integration? 
Challenging the dualistic approaches
In the above mentioned debate on principialism and its critiques the main line of 
divide was actually between the abstract normativity of mainstream/traditional bio-
ethics and the contextual, embedded, situated, descriptive or narrative approaches 
proposed as alternatives to the mainstream approach. Th ere are many ways to relate 
to this dualism. Traditionally it was held that the integration of the philosophical/
normative approach and the empirical one is both epistemologically and method-
ologically an impossible attempt. Th ere are however some scholars who point out 
the problems that are inherent in separating facts and values and they propose to 
transgress the gap between a descriptive, empirical argument and ethical analysis 
(Hugaas 2009). Such proposal has been formulated already in the late 50’ by Edel 
and Edel in their book on ethics and anthropology. Th e authors called for a »work-
ing partnership« between anthropology and ethics »which avoids any jostling for 
primacy, or quarrels over vested rights in either methods or problems« (Edel and 
Edel, 1959, p.6).9 According to the authors moral philosophers »have dealt with 
morality as an isolated and self-contained domain, cut off  from relations to psycho-
logical and cultural processes,« their »vocabulary has been explored as though the 
fi eld were separate and meaningful in total isolation, as though its processes of justi-
fi cation were utterly unique and unrelated to processes in knowledge generally, and 
8 For an up to date discussion about empirical research in bioethics see in Th e Americam Journal of Bioethics, 
2009, 9(6-7): 59-103 Kon‘s target article (Kon 2009) and the responses to it. 
9 I made an attempt to respond to their call in an article about bioethics and anthropology (Demény 2008, p. 272)
28
JAHRVol. 1No. 12010
a conceptual chasm has been created between fact and value to preserve the distinct 
character of moral judgment. And what has resulted is …a deadlock or impasse in 
ethical theory« (Edel & Edel 2000, p. vi-vii). Nelson is also questioning the ortho-
dox model of how »is« relates to »ought,« according to which empiricists supply the 
facts; moral philosophers, theologians, and humanists provide the values; and phi-
losophers clarify relevant concepts and ensure valid argumentation. He criticized 
this view as too linear because »it keeps ‘is’ and ‘ought’ on their respective sides of 
the fence,« and he calls instead for »inventing the common wisdom about the rela-
tions between the normative and the descriptive« (Nelson 2000, p. 7-11).
Th e proponents of a critical bioethics are interested in engaging in such approach. 
Critical bioethicists, beside the classical ethical theories are informed by critical so-
cial science too, which claims that it is necessary to understand the lived experience 
of real people in context. In addition critical theories share the ideas and the meth-
odologies of some interpretative theories, examine social conditions in order to un-
cover hidden structures, and admit that knowledge is power. Informed by these 
ideas critical bioethics asks how social science research can meaningfully contribute 
to philosophical bioethics? According to the adepts of critical bioethics a practice 
that simply documents the ethical practices of a specifi c environment could be rath-
er conservative, supporting rather than challenging systems and practices. To avoid 
this, critical bioethics must be more than purely descriptive, it should be refl exive, it 
should review theories if they are challenged by practice and last but not least it 
should be rooted in empirical research (Hedgecoe, 2004). 
Transgressing the gap between a descriptive, empirical argument and a normative, 
philosophical one is not only a methodological, but also an epistemological chal-
lenge, which, if it is successfully solves, creates a space for interdisciplinary practice, 
a practice that seems to be extremely needed and valuable exactly in the current 
context of knowledge production created by the proliferation of new converging 
technologies. Research in the act of knowing helps us to produce a deeper under-
standing of issues at stake, to realize that there are more than one way to see things, 
that each problem have at least two sides, and there can be credibility on both sides. 
It also helps in not coming too quickly to a conclusion; to be willing to hold off  on 
passing judgment; to be a little bit more willing to play with possibilities and not 
having to come to closure on something too fast (Nikitina 2002).
We have to examine thus fi rst of all whether bioethics has an explicit epistemology, 
a theory of how bioethical knowledge is produced. One widely held, although not 
universal approach is that generating bioethical insight does not require agreement 
at the level of fundamental theory. Th is approach has been advanced by Beauchamp 
and Childress, who reject the notion that one must choose a single theory from 
Enikő Demény: Universal Values, Contextualization and Bioethics
29
among the existing theories. Th ey claim that there is much more social consensus 
about principles and rules drawn from the common morality (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2001, p. 4-5). If this approach would indeed mean the openness to a vari-
ety of moral positions and arguments, we could say that it is indeed inclusive and 
pluralistic. However, feminist critiques draw into our attention that in practice 
mainstream, principialism informed bioethics often tend to be a conversation 
among experts, bioethicists, physicians, scientists, and governmental authorities. 
Wolf points out that although there is a great concern in the mainstream bioethics’ 
discourse with patients’ and research subjects’ rights, these people tend to be the 
objects of concern and not participants on their own right in the ethical conversa-
tion (Wolf 1996, p. 25). Jasanoff  also points out that arguments for a meaningful 
deliberative politics in relation to biotechnology did not emerged from offi  cial bio-
ethics in any of the three countries she has analyzed (Janasoff  2005, p. 202).
Feminist scholars fi nd this practice problematic and point out that the conception 
of the generic subject implicit in the principle-based approaches actually privileges 
the perspective of an elite group of experts and scientists.10 Th erefore feminists pro-
pose to re-examine the principles of bioethics; to create new strategies and method-
ologies that interject the standpoints of socially marginalized people, and instead of 
applying abstract principles they call for a more critical approach that would ques-
tion why and how certain dilemmas get cast and than managed as ethical problems 
(Wolf 1996; Tong et al. 2004; Butler 2005). To achieve these aims, they can rely on 
feminist epistemologies, which place emphasis on the relationship between power, 
gender and the means of generating authoritative knowledge, and aim for a more 
democratic process of knowledge production. A bioethics informed by such episte-
mology requires a restructuring of practice of bioethics to be more inclusive. Such 
epistemology emphasizes the importance of acknowledging the standpoint from 
which knowledge is generated and acknowledges the relational nature of knowledge 
production. If this epistemological claim would be taken seriously it would seriously 
challenge the physician, scientist or bioethicist centered »expert« discourse of main-
stream bioethics, and it would give more fl oor for others perspectives too, such as 
lay people’s accounts or social sciences’ ones.
Th is epistemology can be useful in the fi eld of policy making too, in a context in 
which deliberative processes are highly valued in ethical and political decision mak-
ing. Such deliberative approaches have been advanced in knowledge production re-
10 Some further feminist critiques of the principle based approach in bioethics refer to the abstract character of 
bioethical theory, the emphasis on abstract universal norms and the framework of allegedly universal moral prin-
ciples; the use of generalized abstract categories that overlooks key components of morality including the contexts 
that frame health care and the relational bonds that inform patient decision-making. For more feminist views on 
bioethics see for example Tong et. al. 2004.
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lated to new and emerging technologies as a suitable method of knowledge produc-
tion about the new technologies in the present context. Taking into account the 
novelty of these technologies it is preferable by science policy makers to include in 
the debate as many perspectives as possible. Th e UNESCO declaration also encour-
ages dialog and the incorporation of a variety of perspectives in the bioethical de-
bates. An epistemology that put an emphasis on the situated and relational charac-
ter of knowledge can be thus very adequate in this context.
Feminists challenge traditional bioethics to reveal its own perspective(s), to ac-
knowledge and embrace the plurality of human (male and female) voices, to ac-
cept and work with the essential nature of human connection and embodiment. 
Bioethics is and should be strongly committed to autonomy and patient decision-
making, but, as many empirical studies show, cherished principles may not be 
equally salient to the very people whose rights and well-being bioethicists seek to 
protect. It is more realistic to admit perhaps that the human condition is a condi-
tion of dependency, and this contradicts the ideologies of rational autonomous 
agency of modernity. As Tong formulated, »denial of perspective does not achieve 
neutrality, denial of plurality does not bring unity, and denial of connection and 
embodiment does not achieve self-suffi  ciency for the rational, autonomous self.« 
(Tong in Wolf 1996, p. 89) If we take all these into account we can conclude in 
saying that feminists require ethical analysis to be contextual, inclusive and fl exi-
ble (Boetzkes 2001).
Making bioethics discourse more inclusive is certainly necessary and feminist episte-
mology is useful in this context. But can a feminist epistemology transgress the gap 
between particular and universal, between a descriptive, empirical argument and a 
philosophical one in (bio)ethics? Feminist traditionally have been critical toward the 
so called »universal« norms and pointed out that many of them have been formu-
lated exclusively from a male point of view, while women’s experiences have been 
left aside. However, many feminist also admitted that the problem was not with the 
universality, as such, but with the way its »content« has been defi ned. It can be seen 
as a great achievement of feminist thinking that defi ning »universality« only from 
one privileged perspective has started slowly to change.
In the fi eld of ethics too, a growing contingent of feminists think that a framework 
that incorporates universal principles should constitute one dimension of an ade-
quate ethical theory providing that its principles are formulated in non-exclusionary 
terms that refl ect the relational context of individual lives. As Judith Butler has for-
mulated »the problem is not with the universality, as such, but with an operation of 
universality that fails to be responsive to cultural particularity and fails to undergo a 
reformulation of itself in response to social and cultural conditions it includes with-
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in the scope of its applicability. When a universal precept cannot, for social reasons 
be appropriated or when …it must be refused, the universal precept itself becomes a 
site of contest, a theme and an object of democratic debate« (Butler 2006, p. 6). 
Habermas also concludes that sociological reservations off er salutary corrections to 
normativism, but these critiques do not condemn normative theories to failure by 
social complexity. According to Habermas, purely normative considerations keep 
their relevance as long as we accept that complex societies shape themselves in a re-
fl exive manner through law and politics (Habermas 2008, p. 276) Th e selective 
readings of norms that have the grammatical form of universal statements but at the 
semantic level are vulnerable to particularistic interpretations of their basic con-
cepts, such as persons, human being, call for an empirical explanation (Habermas 
2008, p. 285). What both feminist and critical theories emphasize in connection 
with universalistic claims is refl ectivity upon such norms and concepts. Taken all 
these into account, and bearing in mind that a feminist ethical analysis shall be con-
textual, inclusive and fl exible, I am joining Daniel Callahan’s view according to 
which »there should not ordinarily be any decisive victory for particularism or uni-
versalism. Th ey should over the long run fi ght to a draw, existing in tension with 
each other, with context and circumstance determining their relative weight« (Cal-
lahan 2000, p. 37-38).
Contextualization: a useful method for interdisciplinary inquiries 
Transgressing the gap between a descriptive, empirical argument and a normative, 
philosophical one is not only an epistemological, but a methodological challenge 
too, (Parker 2007) which, if it is successful, creates new methods for interdisciplin-
ary practice, a practice that seems to be extremely needed and valuable in the cur-
rent context of knowledge production created by the proliferation of new converg-
ing technologies. Indeed, interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity appear to be one 
of the most prized/acknowledged characteristics of current knowledge politics, both 
are highly valued and are seen as signals for post-academic knowledge. To can asses 
whether a practice is interdisciplinary or not there is necessary either a defi nition of 
interdisciplinarity, or a set of criteria that should characterise interdisciplinary prac-
tice. Even if we take only a brief account of possible defi nitions and criteria of inter-
disciplinarity we can see that »interdisciplinarity« is a relational and socially con-
structed concept, whose actual content depends on agreed criteria, on how 
disciplines and multidisciplinarity are defi ned, so on. As studies carried out on con-
crete examples of knowledge production practices demonstrate, interdisciplinarity 
in practice can take various forms, with various results, and often processes of 
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knowledge production labelled as interdisciplinary turn out to be more a kind of 
multidisciplinarity in practice.11 Interdisciplinary practice thus is contextual too.
It seems that as easy is to prize interdisciplinarity, as diffi  cult is to defi ne its con-
tours, and it is defi nitely less easy to practice it in an »authentic« way, and the fi eld 
of bioethics it is not an exception of this problem either. Many scholars highlighted 
that even if the problems raised by the new life sciences and technologies are truly 
interdisciplinary in their nature, and the body of theoretical knowledge under the 
name of bioethics has indeed an interdisciplinary character, the methods used to 
produce new knowledge in the area are mainly rooted in monodisciplinary tradi-
tions (Bowden 1995; Kjølberg and Wikson 2007; Azevêdo 2007, Rafols 2007). Ac-
cording to Azevêdo »the contentment with the application of the existing methods 
will dismiss the need for creative ideas on new interdisciplinary methods in bioeth-
ics and this may become the greatest epistemological challenge to bioethics in the 
present century« (Azevêdo 2007, p. 34).
Th e context of this paper does not allow me to address in details such an important 
methodological challenge. Th erefore my intention here is only to draw attention to 
the method of contextualization, as one of the potentially valuable tools for interdis-
ciplinary approaches of bioethical issues that are informed by an integrative episte-
mology that does not strictly separates normative and empirical approaches.12
Contextualization in a broad sense is the act or process of putting information into 
context; and of making sense of information from the situation or location in which 
the information was found. In the context of bioethics this would mean that schol-
ars interested in the ethics of a particular technology should develop a deeper under-
standing from within the problematic situation instead of using only ethical tools 
developed from outside the situation in case. Th ey should focus their attention not 
only on standard issues of bioethics (such as informed consent, moral status of the 
embryo, autonomy, so on), but they should also take into account the context in 
which that particular technology is applied.13An example for such practice from the 
context of new biotechnologies is given by Rayna Rapp who shows through a de-
tailed ethnographic account how one of the least important issues for women con-
11 See for example Demény et al. 2007
12 Th ere are other such proposals in the literature, for example »integrated empirical ethics« (IEE) research is 
advanced by Moljewik et al. IEE »refers to studies in which ethicists and descriptive scientists cooperate together 
continuously and intensively. Both disciplines try to integrate moral theory and empirical data in order to reach 
a normative conclusion with respect to a specific social practice. IEE is not wholly prescriptive or wholly descrip-
tive since IEE assumes an interdepence between facts and values and between the empirical and the normative« 
(Moljewik 2004). See more about this method in: van der Scheer and Widdershoven 2004.
13 We can think of various contexts: social, cultural, economic, legal, but epistemological or metaphysical con-
texts too. For socio-cultural contextualization see for example Gordon et al. 2007.
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templating prenatal testing is the moral statues of the embryo, a main issue in main-
stream bioethics. In this light, those bioethicists who wish to engage with ethical 
decisions as they are lived in the real world should turn their attention towards the 
rights and duties that are involved in relationships with other people in that certain 
context rather than focusing only on abstract moral issues (Rapp 1999). Another 
example for the critique of the decontextualised approach in relation to new bio-
technologies is the work of De Melo-Martin, who argues that a decontextualised 
approach to ethical issues is not just unhelpful for the decision making process of 
real, situated human beings, but dangerous (De Melo-Martin 2006). If we neglect 
the context in which people make moral decisions we run the risk to reinforce fur-
ther injustices against already disadvantaged groups. Miller and Find, in a study on 
placebo-controlled trials of pharmacological treatments and deep-brain stimulation 
for psychiatric and neurological disorders bring to our attention how moral princi-
ples and standards can confl ict when applied to contextually complex situations. 
Th ey claim that careful balancing of morally relevant considerations and an under-
standing of moral norms should guide ethical judgment instead of categorical or 
absolute rules (Miller and Fins 2004).
If we take into account that bioethics discourse about biotechnology has the power 
to defi ne new subject positions, it would be more than desirable to understand how 
medical technologies intervene in the processes and possibilities, not only of self en-
hancement, but also of self-formation. Th e issue of subject formation, of »the modes 
by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects« (Foucault 1982) could 
be therefore another topic where contextualization could help an interdisciplinary 
approach. Th e contexts in this case would be the timeless metaphysical questions of 
human existence: issues of selfhood, worldview, moral belief, and social responsibil-
ity can serve as the connecting glue. To be constituted as a person does not only 
mean that one is provided with physical and psychological capabilities by nature, 
capabilities that eventually can be enhanced with medical technologies. To be con-
stituted as a person means more than this, it is also about developing an identity 
within the meaning patterns of the life world. If these patterns are changed in fun-
damental ways it will have not only ethical, but also existential, ontological conse-
quences for us. Th is would not mean necessarily changes in the human genome. It 
might also happen that new knowledge established by way of medical science alters 
for example our self-understanding, the ways we perceive ourselves as human beings 
(Hoeyer 2002). By taking a look for example to the case of genetic engineering, we 
can see that this has impact not only through its ability to aff ect the structure of liv-
ing tissue. It has also impact as a fi eld of knowledge that, as it becomes increasingly 
normalized, infl uences the way we conceptualize human existence and social inter-
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action. It is important, therefore to take into account the socio-political way in 
which we learn who we are as human beings and the discourses that surround this 
process (Fitzsimons 2005, p.2).
Th ese are only some issues that the contextualizing strategy can eff ectively address. 
All the examples presented above highlight the utility of contextualization as an in-
terdisciplinary method. It can help to »fi ne-tune« the universal framework proposed 
to bioethical issues by making it more sensitive to various contexts and off er solu-
tions that are more helpful in real life decision situations and are endorsed and ac-
cepted by a larger audience, public. It also demonstrates how both normative and 
empirical arguments have to be considered in order to make sense of how certain 
technological applications are »working« in real life and what type of moral, ethical 
and ontological concerns they raise. According to the new science policy on techno-
logical and scientifi c development such knowledge shall be used not only to under-
stand the ethical, social and economic implications of some new technologies but 
preferably the process of development of new applications shall take it into account. 
Only in this way it can be claimed that a given technology will be »socially robust«.
Conclusion
Taken into account that the issues that are at stake in the ethical debates on the ap-
plications of various biotechnologies and genetics can deeply aff ect the ways we per-
ceive us as humans, our relationships with others, and with the environment it 
would be more than desirable that in these debates a plurality of approaches and 
voices to be represented. In this paper I tried to contribute with some ideas to how 
dualistic approaches in bioethics can be changed with more inclusive and integrative 
approaches both at the level of epistemology and methodology. Relying on ideas of 
feminist epistemology and critical bioethics I supported the view that a framework 
that incorporates universal principles shall constitute one dimension of an adequate 
ethical theory in the context of life sciences and new technologies providing that the 
principles it relays on are formulated in non-exclusionary terms that refl ect the rela-
tional context of individual lives. I argued that such a framework could provide use-
ful background for developing and employing methodologies that are suited for in-
terdisciplinary inquiry on various bioethical issues and problems, suggesting 
contextualization as one of the possible methods that could be effi  cient in interdisci-
plinary attempts aimed to understand the relationship between universal and par-
ticular, global and local when dealing with issues raised by new techno-scientifi c de-
velopments.
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